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## WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: BERLIN: ST. PETERSBURG: WASHINGTON.

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LONDON, *November, 1904.*

THE apathy which, except in its closing hours, appeared to mark the public attitude toward the Presidential election even in America amounted in England to something little short of sheer indifference. For this there were several obvious reasons. The campaign, for one thing, seemed to us on this side of the Atlantic singularly unspectacular and, in a sense, singularly unreal. Compared with the elections of 1896 and 1900, it struck Englishmen as lacking both in personal picturesqueness and in public interest. Had Mr. Roosevelt followed Mr. Bryan's example and stumped the country, had Mr. Parker made his oratorical effort six weeks instead of two weeks before polling-day, the contest would have been followed over here with real avidity. As it was, the campaign made next to no appeal to that dramatic sense which every American election is expected to excite. We hoped a good deal from Mr. Parker after his telegram to the St. Louis Convention. It revealed a man where we had suspected nothing but an enigma, and we settled ourselves comfortably in our seats with the expectation of assisting at a vigorous and closely fought struggle. But the aftermath was a disappointment. So far as we could see, Mr. Parker did not improve on his position, as he might and should have done. He won, indeed, and never lost, the respect of all English onlookers as a man of courage, independence and scrupulous regard for the dignities and proprieties of judicial and political life. But until the final moments of the contest, his campaign appeared to lack aggressiveness and decision, and the impression made by his personality grew fainter and fainter. Nor could we see that any issues of public moment either to America or to the world came to the front. The differences between the

two parties, when there were any differences at all, never seemed to amount to more than differences of argument and theory.

Moreover, no British interest was involved in the campaign. In 1896, our concern in the preservation of the gold standard was second only to America's. In 1900, for political as well as sentimental reasons, we could not be indifferent to whatever decision the American people might come to on the general question of Imperialism. Moreover, we had four years ago the eloquence of the American pro-Boers to keep us interested. But this year neither the conduct of the campaign, nor its issue, touched us in any tangible way.

As a nation, we were for once free from the temptation to take sides in American politics. As a nation, we had no preference for Mr. Roosevelt over Mr. Parker or for Mr. Parker over Mr. Roosevelt. As individuals, we could not help having our predilections. Mr. Roosevelt we admire. His character and career, his intense virility and decisiveness in office, have made a deep and genuine impression on British opinion. In his policy we have found much to applaud and little, if anything, to quarrel with; he has seemed to us to rank with the most high-minded and efficient Presidents that America has yet produced. On personal grounds, therefore, and without having anything whatever against Mr. Parker, most Englishmen hoped to see Mr. Roosevelt elected. But they would not have been in the least disconcerted by Mr. Parker's success. On the contrary, they would for some reasons have welcomed it. Those who in this country follow American affairs closely and with knowledge—and, happily, they are growing more numerous every year—have for some time been anxious to rescue Great Britain from the suspicion of being better disposed towards the Republicans than towards the Democrats. It is perfectly true that, for the past decade, we in England have found ourselves more in sympathy with the former party than with the latter. The Republicans preserved the gold standard. It was under a Republican Administration that the United States entered on that course of Imperialism and of international activity which has the heartiest good wishes of the British people. The enormous improvement in Anglo-American relations which the last few years have witnessed has coincided with the presence in Washington of Republican Presidents and Republican Secretaries of State. Moreover, the memory of Mr. Cleveland's Vene-

zuelan message and the irruption of Bryanism have served still further to widen the gulf between England and the Democratic party. In the judgment of Englishmen that party is still tainted with the spirit of Anti-Imperialism and among the rank and file Anglophobia, though only in a passive form, is thought still to obtain. But while Englishmen believe this, they believe also that immediate contact with realities, such as office alone can give, would work a wondrous change in the Democratic attitude. It would make clear to them how thin and sentimental has been their objection to Imperialism, and how impossible it is for them to continue much longer evading the responsibilities of America's new position; and, above all, it would reveal to them that Great Britain is not the friend of this party or of that, but of America as a whole.

It has been a common complaint for years among Americans that Englishmen do not take the trouble to inform themselves on American affairs. I will not say that the accusation, once but too justifiable, has lost all its basis. But I will say that it is rapidly losing it. If Americans will glance over the leading English papers for the past few months, they will, I think, agree that the discussion of the Presidential election has on the whole showed remarkable perseverance, thoroughness and accuracy. I doubt whether they will be able to claim that any General Election in Great Britain has ever been discussed by the American press more fully or with greater knowledge. Some mistakes, of course, there have been, nor, considering the appalling complexities of American politics, could they well have been avoided. But almost without exception they have been mistakes of detail. The general situation and the principal issues have been well grasped and most ably expounded. The days, indeed, have completely gone by when Englishmen were content to remain in ignorance of American affairs. Every paper now seems to have its own American correspondent, and the superstition that New York is the pivot of American life and the only real source of American news, has been outgrown. In the November issues of the great monthly reviews which so admirably instruct British opinion, there appeared no less than eight or nine articles dealing with the personal and political aspects of the late Presidential election. The new interest in all things American, which has sprung up so suddenly all over Europe in the past few years, is nowhere more pervasive

or better informed than in England. This is precisely as it should be. There is no country with which Englishmen feel themselves in closer touch and sympathy. The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, which is now being negotiated, is not needed if the intention of its framers is to emphasize the cordiality of Anglo-American relations. Those relations have at length reached a stage where any public manifestation of the ties that unite the two countries is superfluous; and such value as the new Arbitration Treaty, if and when ratified, may be expected to possess will be general rather than specific, a contribution to civilization at large rather than an addition of any peculiar importance to the stock of Anglo-American good-will.

It is impossible for an Englishman to touch, however briefly, on Anglo-American relations without thinking of the accomplished lawyer, speaker and diplomat whose good fortune it has been to preside over and to further their improvement. I mean, of course, Mr. Choate. Mr. Choate has now served a longer term as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's than any of his predecessors since the retirement, thirty-five years ago, of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. To mark the occasion the American colony in London has decided to present him, at the annual Thanksgiving-day dinner, with a portrait of himself, painted by Mr. Herkomer, and to place a replica of the portrait in the offices of the Embassy. It is a wholly American affair, the subscribers being restricted to "Americans residing or having interests in England." But though English subscriptions have—very properly, from the standpoint of diplomatic etiquette—been ruled out, there has been nothing to prevent Englishmen from showing their interest in the presentation or their regard for its recipient. I have nowhere seen this interest and regard better or more accurately reproduced than in a recent editorial in the "Morning Post." "Mr. Choate came to us," says this admirable journal, "with a great reputation as a lawyer, a wit, and a brilliantly effective fighter for the purity and freedom of American politics. He has now, in a larger sphere, added immeasurably to his titles to fame by proving himself one of the most popular and capable of diplomatists and a potent and untiring instrument of Anglo-American good-will." After describing the multitudinous demands that are made upon an American Ambassador by society, by literary, philosophical, political, educational institutions and by the

English passion for after-dinner oratory, the "Morning Post" winds up:

"To all these demands and many others Mr. Choate has responded with unwearied kindness and unflinching aptitude. No serious question has arisen between the two countries during his term of office; none need arise during the many years that we still hope to have him with us. . . . But the days have happily gone when the worth of an American Ambassador in London or of a British Ambassador in Washington need be gauged by the standards of merely 'diplomatic' achievements. The social side of both high offices now competes with, if it does not overshadow, their official and diplomatic side, and it is by mingling freely in the life of the nations to which they are accredited that British and American Ambassadors really do their best work in bringing the two countries together. No one whom America has ever sent us has been better qualified than Mr. Choate by temperament, intellectual equipment, and complete mastery of all the arts of social success, to make the most and the best of such conditions. He has established himself as a universal favorite, for his own sake as well as for the sake of the country he comes from; and the presentation which his countrymen in Great Britain are to make him carries with it the affectionate esteem of the entire British people."

Since my last letter England has been nearer to war with Russia than she ever was with France over Fashoda. When the news of the North Sea outrage reached England, two days after it had occurred, the first sensation of the country was one of sheer amazement. As the details poured in, amazement passed into burning indignation, but for fully twenty-four hours afterwards no one, I think, considered it possible that war could be its outcome. The very enormity of the crime seemed in a way to be a guarantee of peace. But when the days passed by and nothing was received from St. Petersburg, except a telegram from the Tsar to the King, which English opinion certainly undervalued, it was quickly realized that war might, after all, be only a question of hours. Men of every shade of political thought rallied instantaneously behind the Government. The Government, almost for the first time in its history, became really representative of the entire country. Opinion concentrated with remarkable speed on four demands—(1) that apologies should be exacted, (2) that prompt and adequate compensation should be made, (3) that those guilty of the outrage should be punished, and (4) that satisfactory guarantees should be forthcoming against the repetition of any such criminal blunder. From one end of Great Britain to the other you would not have found two opinions on the necessity of

making these demands and, if need were, of enforcing them. For three whole days it appeared all but inevitable that they would have to be enforced. When the Russian press began talking as though Admiral Rozhdestvensky had acted in self-defence and as though the fishermen were to blame; when, in particular, the Admiral's own amazing version of the affair came to be circulated; then, indeed, English opinion, outwardly calm and restrained, grew undoubtedly bloodthirsty. The Government did not prepare for war; there was no necessity to; the game was entirely in our hands, and nothing more was needed than the precaution of arranging the concentration or rather the cooperation of the Home, Channel, and Mediterranean fleets. Not a ship was put in commission; it was simply a question of disposing of those already on service to the best advantage. But the activity at the dockyards naturally did nothing to diminish the expectation of war. Even within a few hours of the Russian agreement to the British demands, the bulk of opinion, so far as I could gauge it, inclined to the view that war would come. Popular interest reached an unprecedented height. At the decisive stage of the crisis, the manager of one of the great London daily journals told me that he had spent most of the morning answering prepaid telegrams from all over the country from people he had never seen or heard of, asking for the latest news. In all his experience, which goes back over forty years, he had never known anything like it. It speaks well for English self-possession that public feeling only once got out of hand. That was when the Russian Ambassador, hurrying back to town from the Continent, was "booed" on his arrival in London. Otherwise, the calm of the country might have deceived, and in fact did deceive, those who were not well versed in the national psychology. The relief which greeted Mr. Balfour's announcement of the settlement was the only outward token of the tensivity of popular emotion. I will not say that the settlement pleases everybody. There were and are a few who think it insufficient, and whom nothing would have satisfied but the forced return of the Baltic fleet to Cronstadt. But now that its terms are fully known, now that negotiations for putting it into effect are progressing smoothly, the country as a whole is well pleased. The only feature of the British case which might have been omitted was Mr. Balfour's brilliantly scathing analysis of the Russian Admiral's "explanations"—an analysis which was

in effect an attack upon the rectitude of that remarkable seaman. It should have been omitted, not merely because his conduct was *sub judice*, but because it gave the impression that the Admiral himself would be held for examination. When he sailed from Vigo a few days later, leaving behind only four subordinates to represent the Russian case before the Court of Inquiry, it had all the effect of an English diplomatic defeat.

The Anglo-Russian crisis has rather crowded out the Fiscal issue, and the meeting of Conservative Associations at Southampton at the end of October, instead of being engrossed with the tariff question and the relations between Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain, was overshadowed by the cloud of war. Nevertheless, the meeting passed resolutions that endorsed all in Mr. Balfour's programme that is acceptable to the Chamberlainites and passed over the remainder in silence. It did nothing to elucidate the quantity or the quality of the Prime Minister's sympathy with his ex-Colonial Secretary's propaganda, but it proved pretty conclusively that the Conservative party is once more a party of Protection and unwilling to call a halt even at the half-way house of Retaliation. That is significant, even if it leaves the question of whether Mr. Balfour is for Mr. Chamberlain or against him as much an open question as ever. Another significant development in the fiscal campaign has been the candidature of Sir John Cockburn for the seat rendered vacant by the death of Sir William Harcourt. Sir John Cockburn is a Colonial, an Australian I believe, who for some years represented his Colony in London as its Agent-General. He was put up by the Chamberlainites as a special spokesman of Colonial opinion, and the local Conservatives adopted him as their candidate with effusion. Like almost all Colonials, Sir John is an intense Radical. There was not a single point of sympathy between himself and his Conservative supporters, except his advocacy of Tariff reform. On the Licensing question, the Education question, the Church Disestablishment question, the Payment of Members question, Home Rule and the Land question, he was utterly opposed to the party for which he was standing. "The interesting experiment," as "The Times" called it, ended in a smashing defeat. So, it is to be hoped, for the honesty of English politics, such experiments will always end. Yet a third incident, not less noteworthy, has been the purchase of "The Standard" by Mr. C. A. Pearson, the



Chairman of the Tariff Reform League. "The Standard" has vastly improved its position within the last eighteen months by refusing to bow the knee to Mr. Chamberlain, and by its unflinching advocacy of Free Trade from the Unionist standpoint. It spoke in a special sense for such men as the Duke of Devonshire, Mr. Ritchie, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, Lord George Hamilton, and Lord Hugh Cecil. Its capture by the Chamberlainites now leaves London with only one penny paper—and that one an evening paper, the "Westminster Gazette"—to uphold the Free-Trade cause. If one were so foolish or so innocent as to regard London as synonymous with England, and the opinion of the London press as representative of English opinion, the conclusion could hardly be avoided that the return to Protection is assured. But every one who really knows England would at once deny both the premises and the inference drawn from them.

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BERLIN, *November, 1904.*

ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY'S night attack upon defenceless fishermen engaged in the peaceful pursuit of their calling seems to have touched the pulse of outraged humanity throughout the civilized world. With one voice the press of Central Europe, saturated with Anglophobia, and accustomed, as it is, to Russian methods of barbarism, and to political subserviency to that country, branded the execrable outrage off the Dogger Bank as one of the most savage, inexcusable, and unpardonable blunders ever committed on the high seas. People on the Continent were literally astounded at the evasive conduct of the Admiral, who even after the slaughter on that fatal night might still have made honorable amends by putting into Dover, or some other English port, to offer apologies and reparation, but who chose with his rabble crews to make off like a thief in the dark without even deeming it necessary to report the matter to his own Government; at the cynical indifference of the man for human life, for the elementary principles of international comity, common decency and honor; at his mendacity, patent and glaring in every line of his crazy and craven "explanation," extracted from him only at the urgent solicitations of his own Government, which, in turn, was moved to act only through fear that failure to explain and apologize would involve the nation in immediate hostilities. And so, when

the crisis came, all Europe was prepared to hear that the British Navy had been entrusted with the task of exacting retribution. Nevertheless, the peaceful solution of the difficulty was universally welcomed with unfeigned feelings of relief, in which Germany sincerely participated. The tact, patience and diplomatic bearing of the British Government in circumstances of exceptional provocation were not only admitted, but even warmly praised, by the whole Continental press. The announcement that the Russian fleet was to remain at Vigo until the finding of the international Court of inquiry, was acclaimed generally as a great moral victory for England; who, it was contended, by her firm example of forbearance and clemency, had not only established a magnificent precedent for arbitration on all future occasions of strife between nations, but had served the interests of civilization in a highly remarkable manner. All felt that England, with her mighty navy, could have destroyed the Russian fleet in a few hours had the Government so willed it, and all felt that it was only due to the imposing display of naval power that Russia yielded, or compromised, at all. With the feeling of relief that war had been avoided came the feeling of satisfaction that so dangerous a man as the Russian Admiral, who, on his own showing, shot blindly at all craft venturing within his zone of fire, was to be brought to trial to answer for his crime; came, too, gratitude and respect for England's "triumph."

Now all has changed. The departure of the Russian fleet from Vigo created a feeling on the whole Continent of stupefaction and disappointment. Everybody believes that England has once more allowed herself to be duped by Russia, and has made herself rather ridiculous by meekly giving way after so pompous a display of naval power, press rhetoric and beating of drums. The Continent had been led to understand from Mr. Balfour's own words that a portion, at any rate, of the Russian fleet was to be detained at Vigo until redress had been given, and the guilty parties—in this case admittedly the Admiral himself—had been punished, and in that belief had welcomed the solution. But now that the Russian fleet, still under the command of the infamous Admiral, has left Spanish waters, leaving behind as hostages, or scapegoats, four (probably perfectly innocent) subalterns, everybody is asking the pertinent question what all the pother has been about, if that is to be all. Was it for this that

the whole British Navy was mobilized, and the world threatened with war? Would it not have been more dignified to have talked less and done more? And so the foreign press is casting ridicule upon Great Britain. By standing manfully up to Russia England would have re-established her prestige in the eyes of all Europe; as it is, Mr. Balfour, finding that without fighting he could obtain nothing more from Russia, put his pride in his pocket, and decided for peace. Chinese mandarins cut off the heads of a few minor officials when their own heads are in jeopardy, and as life is cheap in Russia some scapegoat, doubtless, will be found; for nobody now believes that condign punishment will ever be meted out to any of the culprits, whatever the finding of the Court may be, and however forcibly represented.

Politically viewed, as in England so on the Continent, opinions vary as to the ultimate wisdom of a peaceful solution. The Socialists are profoundly disappointed that England did not complete the *débâcle* of Russian arms by destroying the Russian navy, and, together with victorious Japan, hasten the advent of progress and reform in the internal administration of Russia. Nor are there serious political voices lacking who maintain that England has thrown away a golden opportunity, that may never occur again, of crushing an enemy with whom she never can live on terms of friendship, and who now, humiliated but not humbled, will abide her time, until, like a wounded panther, she can spring at the throat of her foe.

Meanwhile the personal alliance between the German and the Russian Emperors is growing more and more apparent, and has recently received signal demonstration. By order of the Tsar and the German Emperor, the old arrangement existing in the days when Germany was reinsured to Russia has been renewed—whereby the German military attaché in St. Petersburg and the Russian military attaché in Berlin have been attached to the personal military suites of the Emperors to whose Courts they are respectively accredited. This shows the complete confidence placed by the Russian military authorities in Germany's "benevolent neutrality," and is the first public manifestation of the existence of that alliance between the two Governments which the German semi-official organs have been so zealous in denying. It is no exaggeration to say that it opens a new era in the relations between Germany and Russia, cementing the solidarity of the East

of Europe as opposed to the West, against which, too, it is directed. Nor have Admiral Rozhdestvensky's numerous outrages upon the high seas failed to accentuate that fact. On the one hand, we find France inwardly chafing at the brutal folly of her ally, and actively seeking by skilful mediation to prevent Russia from rushing blindly into war—herself determined not to risk a ship in so base a cause; and, on the other, Germany, reticent and extremely anxious, fearful lest Russia should appeal to her new friend for help—which, in the circumstances, she, too, would have refused. How real was Germany's fear of war and European complications during the crisis may be gauged from her cringing attitude, official and public, towards Russia, when it was discovered that the German trawler, "Sonntag," of Geestemünde, had also been favored with the attentions of Russian quick-firing guns, and had only escaped the fate of the Hull trawler, "Crane," by cutting her nets and making off as speedily as possible. Though the affair was duly reported, the entire German press, which valiantly thundered against the Russians for firing at English ships, for three days suppressed all mention of the insult to their own flag, until the welcome news came from England that a peaceful solution had been arrived at, when the "incident" was casually referred to without the slightest trace of indignation or resentment. Even the Pan-German organs betrayed no umbrage; while the Government not only took no notice whatever, but positively stated that it had no intention of lodging even the mildest of verbal protests with the Russian Government. This lick-spittle attitude was, of course, dictated by purely political considerations, and deservedly earned the gratitude of the Tsar; for there can be no doubt that had Germany associated herself with England, as she has shown herself so willing to do in similar cases in the past where minor States, such as Venezuela, are concerned, and cheap glory without personal danger is preassured, Russia would have found herself in a still more serious predicament. That Germany did not do so, but deliberately contributed to support Russia's already indefensible position, by carefully abstaining from making known or pressing her own claim for reparation, is a point that should be carefully noted, if only because it shows, as the Socialist organ, "*Vorwaerts*," with grim humor pointed out, that, since Bismarck's day, "We Germans fear God only—and the Tsar."

A few words must be said about the Lippe-Detmold controversy, which, besides being of considerable constitutional and dynastic importance and a unique specimen of a "*querelle Allemande*" in which all Germans take an almost passionate interest, throws an instructive side light upon the character of the German Emperor, and contemporary German history.

On March 20, 1895, the reigning Prince Waldemar of Lippe-Detmold died without issue, thereby necessitating the institution of a Regency, as his legitimate successor, his youngest brother, Alexander, then aged sixty-five, was, and still is, insane. By an edict, promulgated October, 1890, the late Prince Waldemar had nominated, for the office of Regent, Prince Adolphus of Schaumburg-Lippe, a younger brother of the present reigning Prince of that principality, whose family claim to be the nearest agnates to the princely line of Lippe-Detmold, and consequently to be entitled to the ultimate succession to that throne. Now, Prince Adolphus of Schaumburg-Lippe was married to the Emperor's sister, the Princess Victoria of Prussia, having, as it has since transpired, obtained her hand from the Emperor on the express mutual understanding that his family should ultimately secure the Lippe-Detmold succession. And, in accordance with the terms of the edict, Prince Adolphus, in March, 1895, assumed the Regency. Meanwhile, a powerful claimant arose in the person of Count Ernest of Lippe-Biesterfeld; and so popular was his claim that, to avoid further friction, with the consent of all parties the question was submitted to a Court of Arbitration composed of six members of the Supreme Court of the Empire, with the late King of Saxony as president. On June 27th, 1897, that Court decided in favor of Lippe-Biesterfeld, despite the contention of the Schaumburg line that the claims of Count Lippe-Biesterfeld were vitiated by the fact that the head of the line, his ancestral grandmother, Modeste von Unruh, had belonged to the "*petite noblesse*." This decision was considered at the time to be final, and Prince Adolphus had to retire from Detmold, Count Ernest of Lippe-Biesterfeld assuming the Regency on July 17th, 1897. Then it was that the Emperor first publicly intervened by means of a telegram in which he said to the retiring Prince Adolphus: "Your Regency has certainly been a blessing. Detmold will never obtain a more worthy lord and lady. Many greetings to Victoria, and my warmest Imperial thanks for the devoted loyalty with

which you administered your office." To this the people of Lippe retorted by a public address to the incoming Regent, saying: "Nobody more worthy can be our sovereign Lord, nobody more worthy our sovereign Lady, then Count Ernest of Lippe-Biesterfeld and his illustrious consort." The verdict of the King of Saxony having established the claims of Lippe-Biesterfeld to the succession, the Schaumburg line then challenged the claims of his descendants, on the ground that the wife of the Regent, who was a Countess von Wartensleben, was the daughter of Mathilde Halbach-Bohlen, who was the child of American parents; the point being that the descendants of an American grandmother were not of good enough birth to sit on the throne of a small German state. Thus, owing to the plebeian births, considerably over a hundred years ago, of the ancestral grandmothers on the male and female sides of the Biesterfeld line, the sons of the Regent were alleged to be incapable of ascending the throne. To quash this contention, the Government of Lippe-Detmold, with the consent of the Diet, enacted a law, March 16th, 1898, nominating the eldest son of Count Lippe-Biesterfeld, Count Leopold, legitimate heir to the Regency. In the same year, the Emperor manifested his displeasure in a remarkable fashion. On the Regent complaining to the Emperor that the officers of the garrison of the Principality declined to address his children as "*Erlaucht*" (Serenity), His Majesty replied in a telegram: "Your letter received. Instructions of Commanding General were issued with my approval. To the Regent what is due to the Regent, nothing more. For the rest, I forbid you, once and for all, to address me in the tone which you have seen fit to use towards me."

This telegram aroused widespread indignation in Germany, where it was universally condemned. Then for six years there was a lull in the controversy, until September 26th of this year, when the Regent, Count Ernest of Lippe-Biesterfeld, who for nearly thirty years had been a permanent invalid, and during his reign had acquired universal respect and admiration, died, leaving the office of Regent to his son Leopold, a young officer in the German army. In dutiful respect, the son immediately informed the Emperor of the death of his father, and ere nightfall received the following telegraphic reply: "I express my sympathy at the death of your father. As the legal situation is by no means

cleared up, I cannot accept the assumption on your part of the Regency, nor can I permit the soldiers to take the oath of allegiance."

The effect of this singular telegram of condolence was electrical. Apart from its harsh, almost indecent, tone at such a moment, the telegram, which bore the signature "William I. R.," was an unconstitutional act, as all Imperial edicts, to be valid, must be accompanied by the signature of the Chancellor. Moreover, by refusing to allow the troops of the Principality to take the oath of allegiance, the Emperor established an anarchical condition, contrary to all military precedent and constitutional usage; while his description of the legal situation as "not cleared up" denoted nothing more nor less than an arbitrary infringement upon accepted law and authority—namely, the law enacted by the Lippe Government in 1898. Lastly, it flouted the dignity of the Chancellor, who was called upon to resign, or offer explanations. The outcry was so great that the Chancellor, who is an adept in the art of explaining his Imperial master's words and actions, issued what he styled an "authentic interpretation" of the telegram, in which, in bad German, he repudiated the idea that the Emperor intended to interfere, and promised that the Lippe question should be settled on its own merits by the law. With this promise the matter now stands; the son of the Regent, Count Leopold, maintaining the Regency. It now only remains to add that, immediately after the death of the Regent, the Lippe Diet made known the text of a secret agreement, signed in 1886 between Prince Waldemar of Lippe and Prince George of Schaumburg-Lippe, to which all the agnates of the Schaumburg line appended their signatures, whereby, on the demise of Prince Waldemar, Prince Adolphus of Schaumburg-Lippe was to succeed to the Regency. Needless to say, this revelation of the unscrupulousness and duplicity of the Schaumburg line still further alienated sympathy from their cause; and it now looks, as the whole question is to be once more submitted to the decision of a Special Court of the Federal Council, as if the Biesterfeld line, after all, will be adjudicated lawful heirs to the succession. Such, in outline, is the history of the controversy, which Bismarck, as long ago as 1895, declared to be settled in favor of Lippe-Biesterfeld. Germans feel so passionately about it, because they realize that the Emperor has not shrunk from resorting to personal abuse, chicanery,

intrigue, arbitrary and unconstitutional misuse of his sovereign power, in order to harry an infirm, but worthy and enlightened, old Count and his son out of a position assigned to them by law, hereditary right, and popular acclamation, and put his sister and her consort in their place, on the throne of Lippe-Detmold.

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ST. PETERSBURG, *November, 1904.*

THE signs of the period are many and ominous, the shadows of coming events dark and weird, for Russia is seething with discontent, burning with shame, tortured by doubt. The peoples who acknowledge the sway of the Tsar are growing, mentally and morally, not by months or weeks, but by days and hours. The scales are falling from their eyes; their consciousness is keener, more intense, their impulse to action is becoming irresistible. From time to time vast multitudes of unwashed, dishevelled, ragged, lean human beings, with no work, no food, no part to play in this world but that of slowly quitting it, rise up wildly and burn the hay, the corn, the houses of the wealthy, especially in the south. Thousands of recruits, with nothing to eat but plenty of alcohol to drink, gut shops, rifle private dwellings, attack the police. Army officers eagerly read seditious pamphlets and forbidden journals, and openly talk "treason," which consists in making a sharp distinction between Russia and her Tsar. Priests prepare for a new era of Church history. Noblemen make common cause with peasants against the caprices of the autocracy, and even courtiers find fault with the dynasty.

In a word, Russia's institutions, political and religious, her social order, her foreign and domestic policy, and even her form of government, are in the crucible, and no man can foretell the shapes which they will assume when they finally emerge thence. Contrasts are extreme to the point of grotesqueness; currents and back-eddies meet, clash and revolve in whirlpools; disorder swells and spreads to the verge of chaos. On one side we see a Government composed of ministers lacking power, initiative, insight and courage, behind whom flit shadowy forms of imperial Grand-Dukes—pullers of the wires which move the entity known as Russia. On the other side, we behold a people bereft of its substance, shorn of its strength, blinded like Samson, and set to grind in its prison house for the support or delectation of the Philistines.



And the likeness between the Russian people and the Hebrew strong man may be further justified by wild happenings in the near future.

Foreigners are bewildered by what they see and hear, and stand puzzled like a country schoolmaster before Egyptian hieroglyphics. For we live in a period of transition. The newspapers are beginning cautiously to condemn the past, to criticise the present, and to claim a voice in ordering the future; yet foreign books, newspapers and reviews are cut, blackened, suppressed by the censor, while the country is flooded with leaflets and proclamations secretly printed and zealously circulated. Literary men meet in private and discuss the coming change of régime; secret conferences are held which resemble the meetings of Girondins and Jacobins in eighteenth-century Paris. Rich men refuse to tax themselves on the demand of the Court, which has not set them an example; just as peasants have to be driven by force from their huts to the barracks, by the order of Grand-Dukes who refuse to quit their palaces. The nation demands peace; the rulers who shun the battlefield order war to the knife, and further insist on hampering the action of the troops. For the operations of army and navy are directed by the "Most High," as the Tsar is officially termed in the jargon of Byzantium, while responsibility for failure is fixed upon the Generals and Admirals who are thus obliged to act against their better judgment. Far from being disconcerted by reverses at the front, the dynasty and its unofficial advisers continue to provoke Great Britain and the United States by arbitrary contraband regulations and murderous attacks on harmless fishermen; while, in the eyes of the thinking section of the people, the myriads of slain and wounded, and the vast crowd of their half-famished brethren slowly dying at home, assume the form of spectral monsters like the ghosts that appeared to Richard III. Such is the condition of Russia as it presents itself from within. Seen from without it is less alarming.

Viewed from that angle of vision, hopes of peace, doubts of victory and rumors of mediation characterize the situation. True, foreign diplomatists and Government journals solemnly assure their hearers and readers that the Tsar's subjects are athirst for vengeance and eager to carry on the struggle to the death. But those who have even a slight acquaintance with the masses know that the contrary is the truth. The Russian people are heartily

sick of the war, which crushes them as no previous campaign ever did. They have had no enthusiasm for it from the outset. For the benighted peasant knows nothing of Manchuria, and feels no impulse to sacrifice the welfare of his family and his own life for the purpose of wresting it from Japan or China. Still, the word of the Tsar was a law to him; and, so long as it was believed that the Russian army would have but to advance in order to drive the enemy before it like sheep, there were few murmurs. But defeat brought reflection, criticism, discontent; and the practical consequences of a long series of retreats opened the eyes of the common man to the fact that it is he and his like who have to bear the brunt of the war, for the sake, not of his fatherland, but of the few privileged personages to whom it is bringing wealth, position, honors and decorations.

For the first time in Russian history the meaning of war has been brought home to the minds of the masses. During the Turkish campaign, its pressure was hardly felt. The law of universal conscription was then only in its embryonic stage, and the contributions of men made by any particular area were quite insignificant. At present, mobilization takes place in vast districts and populous cities, and the men come in crowds wrathful and murmuring. Merchants, officials, clerks, teachers, actors, farmers are summoned from their homes and ordered to cut every tie of kindred, friendship, business, and set out to kill or be killed. There is no discharge in this war. In vain, wives, sisters, brides and daughters fall on their knees in the mud imploring Generals, Privy Councillors and even the Tsar himself, to spare the breadwinner. Fate is not more inexorable. There is only one issue and many take it: suicide. Here, several youths blow their brains out; there, men throw themselves from the upper stories of high houses; in another place, a whole family swallows poison. A few lie down on the rails in front of the trains; many run away; some go mad. Women give birth to dead children in the square where the recruits foregather. Weeping and mourning are universal. Nor is death the worst to be feared. The tortures of the wounded are known to be maddening. Private letters have come from men who lay for forty-eight hours in the field, with festering wounds and parching thirst, forgotten. No wonder that the murmurs of the peasants waxed loud in some places, and became mutiny in others.

Men and priests were sent about the country to fan the embers

of patriotism in the peasant breast. "Our Little Father," they said, "desires to win Manchuria for his children, but the treacherous Japanese are trying to prevent him." But the Russian boors shrewdly made answer: "New land will be useless to us if we lose our lives. There is plenty in Russia, if only we were allowed to till it in peace. As for Manchuria, we know that it is the graveyard of tens of thousands of our brothers. We got on without it under other Tsars, and we do not want it now."

The working-men in cities are still more opposed to the war, for it deals them a much more cruel blow. Even those who are not drafted to the army are thrown out of work and deprived of bread. Of Jews alone, there are over 20,000 men in the Warsaw district in receipt of one pound of dry bread daily from the wealthier members of their community. Other districts of Poland are no better off. And Poland is but a part of the Empire. Those working-men can and do read, and what embitters them most in the newspapers are the oft-repeated boasts of the Government that the available gold reserves are greater now than ever. "The people are famished, while the Autocracy rolls in wealth," they remark. "Autocracy and people are greater enemies than Russia and Japan."

The intelligent classes, too, distinguish between fatherland and dynasty, patriotism and servility; and not without reason. Their best representatives are in fortresses, in prisons, in Siberia or in the coldest parts of northern Russia. Some of them, it is true, have lately been forgiven, but the acts or words for which they were punished are still treated as crimes, and the ex-criminals may at any moment be condemned again without trial or indictment. Their disaffection has already assumed the form of opposition to the war and, very often, of sympathy with Japan. The press has noticed this sentiment and condemned it. Although not surprised myself, I more than once argued the point from curiosity. "After all," I objected, "the Japanese are your enemies; and, if you find anything to admire in them, it can only be their love of country." "Quite so," was the answer I most frequently received. "They have a country, and they love and serve it; whereas we have not. They are fighting for their nation, while we are dying for a group of privileged persons who treat the Russian people as their enemies. The Japanese, being the enemies of our enemies, are therefore in a certain sense our friends."

These feelings, gathering strength as they spread, are being transmuted into popular passion. A section of the press, profiting by the dismay of the Government, gives them utterance, sometimes clearly, emphatically, brutally. Here is a symptomatic instance of plain speaking. Prince Trubetskoy, who occupies a chair in the Imperial University of Kieff, complains that Russia had been sleeping for generations and is now awakened by Japan, who has humiliated her pride and revealed her weakness:

“Who is to blame for that? The Russian people? But the Russian people slept by order of the authorities. And for many years all conceivable measures were adopted to keep them from awakening. When, from time to time, any one seemed about to rise up and speak in a human voice, he was held to be disturbing public order and endangering public safety. And the warning order was heard: ‘Silence! Lie quiet!’ while a brawny arm thrust down the raised head. For many years past, Russia has resembled a dormitory in a police station.”

That is plain speaking with a vengeance, and it is the expression of the thoughts and feelings of nearly a hundred millions.

That the really religious classes in Russia should feel no enthusiasm for the war is only what one would expect. Their kingdom is not of this world. But what is more significant and surprising is that they, too, are in opposition to the Government which continues the war. For they are never immune from persecution, never free to save their souls in their own way. What most of them teach is that God has greater power and, therefore, stronger claims to obedience than the Tsar, and that His behests must be fulfilled whenever they conflict with an Imperial ukase. The Government, discouraging comparisons which set the Tsar below any being—even the Almighty—sends the men who institute such either to prison or to the madhouse.

The most fateful phenomenon of all, however, is the falling away of the Russian merchants. A close caste for many generations, the trading guild still forms a social island in the Tsardom of to-day. Peculiar views, ancient customs, secular traditions, quaint proverbs, distinguish them from every other section of the community. But the one trait which every merchant possessed, and which clung to him even when he lost the religious faith of his fathers, was unbounded devotion to the Tsar, and readiness to spend money generously on any object recommended by his Majesty. But now even the Moscow merchants have buttoned up

their pockets. The recent experience of Morozoff, perhaps the wealthiest merchant in Russia, has been so extensively described in the daily press that I need only say that it illustrates the situation well. The authorities, growing alarmed, inspired the newspapers to shame the merchants into generosity; and articles were published branding the industrial millionaires as "savages," "the progeny of highwaymen," "pirates," and "beasts of prey." But independent journalists made answer that the nabobs of Russia are right. Like the peasants, they are nullities in their fatherland. They pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in direct taxes to the state, they give employment to scores of thousands of workmen, they subscribe enormous sums to hospitals—in a word, they are a force in the country. Yet all the part such a merchant plays is that of a milch cow to the Treasury; and, as the cow is expected to give milk, not to low, so the merchant is expected to pay money down, not to open his mouth even if there be anything wrong and he can set it right. A merchant is not admitted into good society. He is the employer of a hundred impecunious noblemen to whom he pays mere nickels, yet the children of these mendicants are privileged to enter into special high schools and become Ministers of State, while his own children have no such rights. If a merchant's son wants to become a naval officer, he must go to England or Japan.

Even the army and navy, or rather many of their best representatives, are against the war. Why? Because the Government is not giving either service fair play. Admiral Skrydloff may be an admirable commander, despite his unpopularity; but his appointment was the result of a mistake made by a Grand-Duke. General Kuropatkin is not allowed to have any initiative. Each of Kuropatkin's advances against the Japanese was undertaken by orders from St. Petersburg. His celebrated "order of the day" to his soldiers was dictated, word for word, from the capital; and he had to sign it or resign.

All Russia is calling for internal reforms, and the Government answers that there is no money available. The campaign swallows it all up. Already the finances are suffering from the strain; the gold standard is imperilled; the economic condition of the masses is wretched beyond words; and as a direct consequence autocracy itself is in danger. Another serious Russian defeat in Manchuria, together with the fall of Port Arthur, would, I feel

convinced, provoke such a popular resolve to put an end to the meaningless struggle that the Tsar would be obliged to call in representatives of the Zemstvos, and authorize his representatives to open negotiations with Japan with a view to making peace.

But so long as there are victories, real or apparent, to buoy up the hopes of the War Party and to silence the murmurs of the people, peace proposals will not be entertained, nor domestic reforms introduced. For the governing group of Grand-Dukes has learned nothing from the campaign, and forgotten nothing during its progress. There is a new Minister of the Interior, Sviatopolk Mirsky, a smooth-tongued, enlightened and well-meaning man, who is quite ready to comply with the reasonable demands of the people. He has done much to prove his willingness to compromise with the new spirit which now prevails. Thus he connives at outspoken articles in newspapers, and he has pardoned several of the highly respected men whom his predecessor had banished or imprisoned without trial. But, having gone thus far, he has come to a standstill. For he is invested with no power but that of making vague promises and patriotic exhortations. In the two Russian capitals and other cities university students are being arrested and their lodgings searched at night. The army of spies is not only maintained, but increased. The secret body-guard of the Emperor has been more than doubled.

Abroad, too, the old programme is the same. Russia has carried her point of including raw cotton and consignments of metal to Japan in the list of contraband of war. That was a weapon levelled against Japanese industry on the one hand and British and American trade on the other. The pretext is that raw cotton could be employed in the manufacture of guncotton. Everybody in the army knows, however, that a single consignment of raw cotton would suffice to make enough of the explosive to blow up half Russia. But Japan needs cotton for her spindles, which number over a million, and Russia's object is to paralyze that industry. Japan imports metals worth fifteen million dollars, and for American petroleum she pays annually five millions. Out of a total import trade of \$131,490,000 some fifty-nine millions' worth is arbitrarily declared contraband.

In the Middle East, Russia is equally active. In spite of the arrangement between her and England, she seems determined to enter into close relations with the Afghans, to "study" their

country, to keep consuls and to obtain exclusive concessions there. Already official proposals have been sent to the Amir, whose reply is silence; they were twice forwarded with no tangible result. Russia is ready to enforce them in other ways; and officials here hint at the line that will be adopted, by instancing Great Britain's action in Tibet.

The animus felt against Great Britain could not be more frankly exhibited than in the unjustifiable attack delivered by Russian warships upon harmless fishermen in the North Sea. If there had been only the two ships which sank, no word of their fate might ever have gone abroad. And what happened to a flotilla in the North Sea may well occur on the high seas to detached ships. High-handed acts like these make one call to mind the massacres of Blagoveshtshensk and of Taku during the Russian Expedition against the Boxers, the cold-blooded shooting of the Japanese troops before their transport was blown out of existence and the sinking of the "Hipsang" and the "Knight Commander."

The mass of the Russian people ought not to be held responsible for those cruelties. They will be discouraged and forbidden whenever the nation becomes arbiter of its own destinies. For injustice at home and abroad is the work of a court camarilla, not of the much-suffering Russian people.

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WASHINGTON, *November, 1904.*

WE do not purpose here to discuss from the view-point of internal politics the amazing outcome of the Presidential election—amazing, because Mr. Roosevelt carried not only all the Northern and Western States, but also three of the former Slave States, Delaware, West Virginia and Missouri, besides securing a part of Maryland's electoral votes; but rather to indicate how the result is, and should be, regarded by well-informed and thoughtful men in foreign countries. By way of preface, however, we may glance at two or three incidents of the election, which, although ostensibly relating, not to international, but to domestic affairs, really throw some light upon the question, sure to be mooted in European capitals, whether the Republican triumph is likely to be repeated four years hence. One thing is settled by the self-denying declaration which Mr. Roosevelt made when he learned of his victory: the Republicans will lack in 1908 the ad-

vantage of possessing in their standard-bearer a universally known, picturesque, forceful and magnetic personality. Many things may happen in four years, but the emergence from the Republican ranks of a second Theodore Roosevelt is extremely improbable. The Republican party, therefore, must expect to be judged in the next contest by the record which it makes in the coming quadrennium. With the shaping of that record Mr. Roosevelt will have much to do, but it remains to be seen, and is at present doubtful, whether he will be able to control the Senatorial coterie which is committed to the maintenance of the Dingley tariff. That Mr. Roosevelt was supported by a multitude of revisionists, who believed him at heart disposed to favor a reasonable readjustment of the existing customs duties, seems to have been demonstrated by the returns from Massachusetts, which, largely on the issue of revision, chose a Democratic Governor, although it gave the President its electoral votes. If Mr. Roosevelt's influence shall avail to bring about a genuine revision of the tariff, and if he shall use with vigor and effect against law-breaking trusts the powers vested in him by the Inter-State Commerce act and the supplemental legislation, it is probable that the opposition will be unable to make the next campaign pivot on the Trusts and Tariff issues. In that event the Republican party seems likely to retain ascendancy for an extended period, especially if, during the next four years, it should succeed in widening the breach already made in the "Solid South." The startling fact that Missouri was carried by the Republicans suggests that, if Mr. Roosevelt had maintained toward the Southern States the conciliatory policy adopted by his predecessor, there would have been some hope of detaching Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Arkansas from the Democratic column. Even in Louisiana, the so-called "Lily-White" Republicans were becoming a formidable organization, when irritation at the Booker Washington, Crum and other similar incidents caused them virtually to disband. In view of the result in Missouri, it is conceivable that Mr. Roosevelt, if he took measures to check the revival of the race issue, might put his party in a position to obtain in 1906 more Representatives from the Southern States than the Democracy could get from the Northern. Under such circumstances, it would be hard to see how the Democrats could look forward to recovering control of the Lower House of the Federal Legislature. That they



cannot regain for many years to come the preponderance in the Senate which they enjoyed for a brief season in Mr. Cleveland's second term is indisputable. They may, on the other hand, count with some confidence on electing a President and a majority of the House of Representatives, if the Republican party's treatment of the Trusts and the Tariff shall fail to satisfy the masses of the people. As regards, in a word, the permanence of the Republican triumph, no forecast is practicable, until we learn what course Mr. Roosevelt will adopt with regard to the two capital issues in internal politics.

The primary grounds of the interest with which our Presidential campaign was watched in Europe and the Far East are obvious: they have to do with our foreign policy, and with our power of enforcing it by naval and military strength, or of promoting it by alliances or friendly understandings. The facts that Mr. Roosevelt will be President for another term, and that Mr. Hay will continue to be his Secretary of State, are, naturally, accepted as guarantees that there will be no divergence from the positions taken by our State Department during the last three years. There has never been any foundation for the campaign charge that Mr. Roosevelt was inclined to entangle the United States in foreign complications. The despatch of warships to San Domingo, to Tangiers, to Beirut and to Smyrna was a legitimate means of exerting pressure upon delinquent and refractory States which had paid no heed to the diplomatic presentation of just demands. What is our navy for, if not to assure considerate and equitable treatment to our citizens in foreign parts? Unquestionably, Mr. Roosevelt has had more than one pretext for involving us in international imbroglios. He has availed himself of none of them. Our attitude toward China in the matter of the indemnity exacted for the Boxer outrages was a model of forbearance and disinterestedness. There is reason to believe that, but for the influence exerted by our State Department, the indemnity would have been materially larger and the terms of payment more onerous. It is now tolerably certain that, had an inordinate amount of money been claimed from China, the Pekin Government would have renounced the hope of paying it, and the Powers concerned would have found themselves confronted with a revolution throughout the Middle Kingdom. Great Britain would gladly have seen our State Department a

party to the treaty by which England bound herself to assist Japan in certain contingencies. Some specious reasons might have been advanced for such participation on our part: for instance, through our possession of the Philippines we have become an Asiatic Power, and, as such, we were interested in averting the outbreak of war in the Far East. Moreover, had our Government become a signatory of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, it is improbable that Russia would have defied Japan. As a matter of fact, the United States have remained scrupulously neutral in the contest which began last February, and the end of which is problematical. Again, President Roosevelt was invited to act as umpire in the dispute between Venezuela and the three blockading Powers, and also to decide the question whether, in the distribution of Venezuelan revenues, set aside for the payment of foreign debts, a preference should be given to countries which had resorted to force, over those which had confined themselves to diplomatic representations. Here was a tempting opportunity of giving the Monroe Doctrine a status in international law; for, by their proposal, not only Great Britain, Germany and Italy, but the other creditor Powers, had evinced a willingness formally to recognize the hegemony of the United States over the Latin-American republics. Not only did Mr. Roosevelt decline the seductive invitation, but he procured the reference of all European demands against Venezuela to The Hague Tribunal.

Deserving of more attention, also, than it received during the campaign was the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between the United States and France. Like the preceding convention between France and England, to which it closely conforms, the treaty excludes from arbitration such controversies as in the judgment of either signatory affect its national honor or vital interests. It is, however, the Executive, not the Legislature, by which such judgment will be exercised, and, consequently, the pressure to be feared from popular excitement will be minimized. The treaty is not an isolated exhibition of a peace-loving spirit, made for campaign purposes. It is but the first of a series which, when completed, will establish similar relations with almost all the Powers of the European Continent, binding us and them to accept arbitration in lieu of war, except in cases of exceptional gravity. It is understood that the series will be crowned with an arbitration treaty between the United States and

Great Britain. There is reason to believe that every one of these beneficent conventions will receive the needed two-thirds vote in the Senate. It is true that the Olney-Pauncefote Arbitration Treaty was rejected by that body, but an extraordinary change has since taken place in American sentiment. The lingering suspicion with which Great Britain was still regarded by many of our citizens eight years ago, has been almost entirely dispelled. Of the vindictiveness, for which the lurid accounts of the Revolutionary struggle and of the War of 1812 in our school histories were responsible, there remains scarcely any trace. The sympathetic attitude of the British Government during the two months preceding and throughout our war with Spain, sharply contrasted, as it was, with the ill-disguised antipathy of Continental Europe, went far to efface the memory of far-distant quarrels. If the Senate shall reflect the altered temper of the American people—generally in foreign affairs it is a faithful mirror—it will reverse its former action, and welcome the opportunity of minimizing the chances of collision between the sections of the English-speaking world. At all events, Mr. Roosevelt will have done his part when he shall have submitted a cluster of arbitration treaties to the Senate. He will then have given conclusive proof that the "big stick" which he believes in carrying is not the bludgeon of a bully, but a purely defensive weapon.

If any voices refrained from joining in the chorus of felicitation with which Mr. Roosevelt's success has been greeted by foreign diplomatists, they are those of the representatives of Latin-American republics. Silence on their part was, perhaps, to be expected in view of the President's letter, which was read at the Cuban dinner. We should like to believe that the letter was hastily penned, and that the author did not intend his words to bear the construction which on their face they justify. Until we see the declaration formulated in a message to Congress, we shall persist in hoping that the President cannot have meant to assert that the United States should assume toward our sister commonwealths the function of debt-collector in the interests of foreign Powers. There is also a widespread and growing sentiment among far-sighted Americans that it is difficult to reconcile with the essence of the Monroe Doctrine the precedent lately established in the case of Venezuela. We refer to the fact that, with the countenance of our Government, or, at all events, with-

out any known protest on its part, nearly a third of the customs revenues of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello have been set aside for the payment, not merely of damages due for public wrongs, but also of private debts arising out of contracts. Suppose that the fraction of the customs dues thus sequestered had been not thirty, but sixty, or even ninety per cent.! Is it not clear that, under such circumstances, Venezuela would be reduced practically to the condition of Egypt? We ourselves have never yet paid the debts due to British merchants which the Congress of the Confederation pledged our States to pay by the treaty of peace concluded in 1783. Shall we admit that on that account Great Britain has against us a standing *casus belli*? It goes without saying that every Latin-American republic should be held to a rigorous account for any insult offered to the flag or the official representatives of a foreign Power, or for any act of violence committed against the person or property of a foreign individual. Reparation for such wrongs may undoubtedly be secured by the temporary occupation of seaports and custom-houses. We suffered Great Britain to apply such a remedy in the case of Nicaragua. That, however, is plainly a different thing from conniving at the confiscation of a republic's indispensable revenue for the liquidation of ordinary debts.

That the United States will have a navy commensurate with the magnitude of their commercial interests may be looked upon as definitely settled by Mr. Roosevelt's triumph at the ballot-box. It now seems probable that, by the end of the President's second term, Congress will have authorized the construction of a navy second only to England's own. That is to say, our strength upon the ocean, which is believed already to surpass Germany's, will exceed even that of France. That no expansion of the regular army need be looked for under Mr. Roosevelt may be inferred from the fact that, although the authorized *cadre*, or framework, is capable of instant adjustment to a hundred thousand soldiers, only about sixty thousand are at present enlisted. Fair-minded men will acknowledge that the existing number is nearly, if not quite, the minimum which should be maintained permanently under the colors, now that we have given hostages to fortune in the shape of Porto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, Samoa and the Philippines.